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In the United States, World War II was hailed as
the "war to end all wars." The war itself was consid-
ered a classic confrontation between the forces of
liberal democracy and those of German fascism. In-
herent in the ideology of nazism was Adolf Hitler's
"final solution," the specter of rule by a nation com-
mitted to genocide. The Third Reich was dedicated
to the proposition of "Aryan superiority." The Al-
lied Forces, dedicated to the principles of democracy
and freedom (though there were inconsistencies be-
tween principle and practice), vigorously opposed
the geopolitical intentions of Hitler's regime and its
pronounced policy of racial nationalism. Germany,
of course, was not the only country that practiced
racial politics. During the 1920s the United States it-
self was riding the crest of a wave of nativism based
upon racial and ethnic prejudice. 1 Although it did
not approach the degree of German fascism, preju-
dice in the United States has made its contribution
to the phenomenon of scientific racism.
Allan Chase2 has written one of the most provoca-
tive books on the history of scientific racism. He
traces its roots to the economic philosophy of
Thomas Malthus, in particular his essays on popula-
tion. Chase demonstrates how the politics of scar-
city can become a blueprint for the determination of
who should live. Scarcities may occur in food, clean
air, clean water, or living space. The Malthusian dic-
tum that population growth will always exceed food
supply enforces some form of selection and, politi-
cally, the justification of that selection. One method
that has commonly been employed to accomplish
this is the use of pseudoscientific ideas as a means to
distinguish the "deserving" from the "undeserving."
Structured upon the premise that genetic differences
are indicators of qualitative types, scientific racism
seeks to establish a vertical base for social differenti-
ation and the determination of social policy. If it can
be argued that the destiny of German society rests in
the rise of the Aryan nation, it can be argued that the
competition for living space can include the elimina-
tion of those declared undeserving or unfit.
The idea of scientific racism seems antithetical to
a democratic society. Yet within this decade it has
gained attention and has manifested itself in numer-
ous ways. From the turn of century through the
1930s, scientific racism gained popularity in schol-
arly and popular literature. Reaching a highwater
mark in the 1920s with the passage of the restrictive
immigration bill (1924), scientific racism went into
remission until the 1960s, when social changes in the
society opened public opinion to a subtle but
nonetheless invidious form of racism. While public
debate focused on the more overt expressions of ra-
cial exclusion and discrimination, ideas of racial
differences resurfaced and found a receptive au-
dience among those desiring to maintain certain so-
cial arrangements. Gone were the archaic ideas of
phrenology and craniology that assumed that hu-
man worth and behavior could be determined by
body type. Gaining favor were studies that at-
tempted to prove the primacy of heredity over envi-
ronment in the determination of intelligence. If the
language of the new proponents of genetic deter-
minism differed from that used earlier in the cen-
tury, the message was the same: genetic endowment
was the great divider between superior and inferior
types. More conclusively, these differences could not
be mediated through legislation or public policy.
The differences in races were an immutable fact or-
dained by the accident of genetics.
Historically, scientific racism was never a
set of ideas existing outside the influence of
public action.
Historically, scientific racism was never a set of
ideas existing outside the influence of public action.
The perceptions of human differences coexisted
with the desirability of a stratified society. Thus, it is
not surprising that some of the earlier theorists of
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scientific racism were social scientists. 3 These social
scientists framed questions of individual and social
differences as political questions. It was therefore
not surprising that McDougall could ask, "Is
America Safe for Democracy?" or that Edward Ross
would discuss "race suicide."4 Each of their concerns
suggested that the state, without effective means of
control, faced a degeneration in the genetic and in-
tellectual stock of its citizens. In the culmination of
the "final solution," we see scientific racism raised to
the level of state policy.
Pseudoscientific ideas regarding the human spe-
cies have always found acceptance among those
seeking to justify the subordination of others. In
periods of major social changes these ideas tend to
intensify as status positions are challenged or there
is a perception of a threat. During the Reconstruc-
tion Era fears abounded that without strict controls
the presumed unrestrained libidinous nature of
blacks would imperil the white population. 5 When
Eastern and Southern Europeans were stereotyped
as inferior persons, their numbers were restricted
from entrance into the United States in 1924. Histor-
ically, efforts to lift racial restrictions against blacks
have been met with the rejoinder that to do so would
result in the "mongrelization of the white race." In
each instance the group was discredited because of
an alleged feature of their genotype.
It was noted earlier that scientific racism receded
after the 1920s. In fact, by the 1930s many of the te-
nets of scientific racism were falling into disfavor.
Racial exclusion had effectively been reinforced by
law and social practice. Until the 1940s few changes
of major proportion had altered the barriers that
kept blacks from enjoying full citizenship. The after-
math of World War II witnessed the erosion of some
of those barriers. Black Americans aggressively,
even militantly sought change. "This new status,"
wrote the historian John Hope Franklin, "arose not
merely because a substantial portion of the gains
made during the war were retained, but also because
of the intensification of the drive, in several
quarters, to achieve equality for blacks."6 From the
threatened march on Washington by A. Philip Ran-
dolph in 1941, through the administrations of Presi-
dents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, black
Americans gained greater access to housing, voting,
and employment in federal jobs. Important victories
were also won in the fight against segregation in
public education. In terms of its national impact,
the most significant of these victories came in 1954
in Brown v. Board ofEducation of Topeka.
Many commentators and social analysts have
noted the connection between the Brown decision
and the Civil Rights Movement. For there was an as-
pect of the Court's decision that struck at the core of
scientific racism. Although the primary legal ques-
tion involved the philosophy of separate but equal,
vital testimony in the case pointed to the psychologi-
cal implications of segregated public education. In
rendering its decision the Supreme Court said
unanimously: "To separate them [black children]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferi-
ority as to their status in the community that may af-
fect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone."7
The Supreme Court recognized that more was at
stake than the legality of the state providing separate
educational facilities for black and white children.
What the Court decided was that the philosophy of
separate but equal existed under the assumption of
biological differences. Most importantly the Court
decision draws attention to two aspects of scientific
racism that cannot be overlooked. Before comment-
ing on those two aspects it would be worthwhile to
reassert a fundamental characteristic of scientific
racism. Scientific racism is a means of maintaining
power relationships rooted in the idea that rule is a
right of the biologically superior. To assert that right
it is first necessary to establish a context for the de-
termination of superiority and inferiority.
Scientific racism seeks to establish a base for en-
titlement. Based upon the assumption that only the
superior should decide, entitlement is the reward for
those who are superior in genetic endowment.
Through the system of public education most
minority groups have pursued upward mobility.
Blacks especially have sought through educational
attainment to expand their range of social and
professional opportunities. In the South these ef-
forts were restricted by the proscription of legal
segregation. Outside of the South educational ac-
cess was restricted by de facto segregation, the result
of discrimination in neighborhood settlement pat-
terns. These methods of proscription, based upon
racial differences, have served to restrict claims to
entitlement. When the Court argued that segrega-
tion had the effect of generating feelings of inferi-
ority, it tacitly acknowledged that race was a key ele-
ment in restricting entitlement. Therefore, the
Brown case became a critical turning point in this so-
ciety, not only in terms of education, but in the
much broader sense of alterations in the system of
entitlement. Opponents of change resisted the
quarantee of access to people they considered une-
qual. If restraints to access could be overturned
through the courts, could they be reinstated by other
means?
In the years following the Brown decision, there
was renewed interest in mental testing. The preoccu-
pation with quantification resembled that following
World War I and the administration of the first
Army Intelligence Test in 1917. As state and munici-
pal action mounted to either implement or circum-
vent the mandate of the Court, increasing attention
was given to differential results in mass testing of
school children. The argument that emerged, in the
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The quantification of alleged racial
differences in aptitude gave an aura of
scientific objectivity to what had lost
respectability, and legal backing, as a
prejudicial attitude.
tradition of scientific racism, was that genetic en-
dowment counted for more than environment in
mental aptitude. If black children performed less
well than whites, a substantial portion of the expla-
nation for this rested in their genetic constitution.
Their abilities and opportunities were immutably,
genotypically, determined. Even if greater access be-
came available, performance would be naturally
limited. Society could not be "blamed" for what was
essentially an act of nature. The claims regarding the
inferior abilities of blacks were not new. What was
new was the extent to which quantitative data were
being employed to support an old argument. The
quantification of alleged racial differences in apti-
tude gave an aura of scientific objectivity to what
had lost respectability, and legal backing, as a preju-
dicial attitude.
The debate over the differences between test
scores of black and white children reached a high-
water mark in 1969. Arthur Jensen, professor of
education at the University of California, Berkeley,
published an article in the Harvard Educational Re-
view entitled, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and
Scholastic Achievement?"8 Among his findings was
the conclusion that intelligence is 80% inherited and
20% environmental. Whatever may have been Jen-
sen's intentions or claims to free and open inquiry,
the results of his work ignited a furious public de-
bate on the efficient use of public funds for the edu-
cation of black children.
Some critics of President Johnson's Great Society
programs found in Jensen's study supportive evi-
dence for their call for a retrenchment in public
funding for social programs. The racial intent in
many of these arguments was hidden behind an ap-
peal to efficiency in government. If intelligence were
overwhelmingly the result of genetic endowment, no
amount of public funds could change that condi-
tion. While those who accepted the genetic-based
link to intelligence were not necessarily adverse to
the education of black children, their proposals
called for educating them to the limits of their pre-
sumed capacity. These arguments bear a striking
similarity to proposals prior to and just after the
turn of the century. At that time it was not uncom-
mon for Social Darwinists to advocate education
that would train the "lowly classes" for specific slots
in the labor force. The "lowly classes" (who were not
necessarily black) would constitute a stratum who
could be controlled by their access to skills and re-
duced to bargaining their labor for existence. Thus,
on the basis of their alleged inferior genotype, en-
titlement was restricted.
Jensen's work, and a subsequent controversial
publication by Christopher Jencks, 9 also fueled
public debate regarding compensatory educational
programs. These programs snared the premise that
the life course of individuals and groups could be al-
tered through policy intervention. The inheritance
argument, on the other hand, questioned whether
social intervention of a compensatory nature would
produce significant changes relative to the expendi-
ture of funds for such programs. While these de-
bates developed, the IQ controversy was augmented
by the rise in concern over "merit." In fact, the two
ideas merged in the work of Richard Herrnstein. 10
Publications such as Commentary and the Public
Interest became principal forums over the issue of
meritocracy and democracy. Arguing that attempts
to improve the life chances of a group was antitheti-
cal to the principle of individual liberty, conserva-
tive ideologues attacked many interventionist pro-
grams as antidemocratic. They argued that these
programs granted to the disadvantaged an unearned
privilege. What had begun as a quantifier for the ex-
clusion of certain European groups as immigrants in
1917 had reached full political fruition in what Leon
Kamin calls "the science and politics of IQ."
If the debates in the late 1960s and 1970s were not
as overtly racist as those during the first quarter of
the century, there were striking similarities nonethe-
less. The appeal to the inheritability of intelligence
restates essentially the same argument that social
classes are the products of differential genetic stock.
Just as scientific racism in the 1920s and earlier rep-
resented a value premise, the arguments regarding
merit contained a value premise. What is meritori-
ous? How is merit determined and who makes the
determination? Is there an absolute or relative basis
to merit? Does heredity play a role in merit? What
these questions imply is a vertical ordering of soci-
ety, a system of stratification. Invariably this means
a placement of individuals or groups along a con-
tinuum, although not necessarily a permanent one.
Such attempts employ the trappings of verifiability
in lieu of prejudice. This is the very base of scientific
racism. "Scientific racism attempts to make inferi-
ority a matter of science not prejudice." 12 Methodo-
logically, scientific racism attempts to accentuate in-
tergroup differences at the expense of intragroup
differences. The history of scientific racism indi-
cates that class differences have been frequently in-
voked to insulate privilege, restrain mobility, and
limit entitlement.
There were two schemes that surfaced during the
1970s that closely resembled Francis Galton's notion
of hereditary genius and the politics of eugenics.
Stanford University professor William Shockley ad-
vocated during the early 1970s a sterilization bonus
plan. Concerned about the dysgenic consequences
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of "too many babies born to Negroes," Shockley
offered a financial incentive for those blacks whose
IQ fell below the norm of 100 to be sterilized. Basing
his plan on the premise that black performance on
intelligence test was a measure of their inferior bio-
logical constitution vis-a-vis whites, Shockley pro-
posed a payment of $1,000 for every point below 100
they scored. Without a definitive check on the birth
rate of the genetically inferior blacks, Shockley
feared genetic enslavement.
Prior to the development of the sterilization bo-
nus plan, Shockley speculated on a "white gene" hy-
pothesis. This notion held that for every 1% of
"Caucasian genes" in the bloodstream of blacks,
their IQ rose one test point. Shockley concluded that
since lower IQ black mothers are likely to have more
children, they are subjecting their offspring to
genetic enslavement, and the society would realize
the consequences of dysgenics. How he determined
the relationship between IQ and birth rate was never
firmly established, nor on what basis he assumed a
fixed ration between IQ and the quantity of "white
genes" in the blood of blacks.
Harvard professor of psychology Richard Herrn-
stein shared Shockley's concerns regarding the pos-
sibility of "genetic enslavement." He offered no
financial bonus plan, but he did advocate a tracking
system linked to the decennial census. In an inter-
view cited by Allan Chase, Herrnstein ". . . advo-
cated that IQ test scores be recorded by the U.S.
Census takers in order to enable our lawmakers to
observe dysgenic or eugenic trends in American so-
ciety."13 He believed that, if at some future time, it
was necessary to limit population growth, ". . . we
could use census information on IQ to decide how
and when to limit it." 14 Herrnstein's suggestion es-
tablishes a critical relationship between population
size and measured intelligence. But most startling in
his proposal is that living space can be a factor, not
of need, but of genetics.
Apparently those with low IQ scores would be-
come the most expendable, would forfeit any entitle-
ment to living space because of their IQ. Herrn-
stein's plan reflects a historic assumption regarding
intelligence and scientific racism: that is, intelli-
gence is a fixed entity, conditioned only by the acci-
dent of birth. Herrnstein also attempts to influence
public policy by implying a scientific basis for deci-
sion making. In the main his proposal is a compan-
ion to the idea that it is possible to quantify human
value.
A second major aspect of scientific racism that
emerges from the Brown case is its link to power rela-
tions. The restraint or denial of entitlement is a re-
straint on the exercise of power. As mentioned ear-
lier, scientific racism is a means of maintaining
differential power relations through the assertion of
superiority or inferiority. It is an anti-egalitarian no-
tion. It supports the proposition that nature decrees
racial difference and that difference is significant in
the degree of power each is capable of exercising. In
the Brown case, the Court declared that educational
systems had been constructed so that race became
the basis for the denial of choice. For blacks, the
denial of choice meant the inability to assert an
authoritative voice in the decisions affecting how
and under what conditions they were to receive pub-
lic education.
Throughout this discussion it has been asserted
that scientific racism seeks to limit the participation
of those believed to be inferior. This limitation
necessarily restricts the exercise of power over many
aspects of their lives. The same is true where race has
been used as a means to set a group apart, by so do-
ing inferring its inferiority. Their choices have been
proscribed by their birth. Their ability to negotiate
with the larger community is likewise proscribed. A
major social change such as the Brown case forces
an adjustment or realignment in historic patterns of
power relations. Many of the assumptions that de-
fined the old patterns entered into the process of ad-
justment. Blacks were believed no less inferior be-
cause the Court had ruled against segregated
schools.
Since the nineteenth century, scientific racism has
confirmed the fact that there is power in an idea. As
a collective body of thought, scientific racism has
been a powerful inducement to action. Winthrop
Jordan, 15 George Fredrickson, 16 Stephen Jay
Gould, 17 and Thomas Gossett 18 have clearly demon-
strated the organizational power of an idea regard-
ing the presumption of differences in the human
species. Their studies represent persuasive evidence
of the political consequences of scientific racism.
They also affirm W.I. Thomas's adage, "If a man de-
fines a situation as real, it is real in its consequen-
ces." Throughout its existence and its manifestation
in racial segregation, scientific racism has produced
ideas that have sustained the belief that blacks are
inherently inferior. Many of the tenets of racial su-
periority and inferiority compose the body of
thought presented in school texts. This has espe-
cially been the case in biology.
In recent years arguments concerning affirmative
action and minority admissions into the universities
have contained the seeds of scientific racism, if not
its essence. With an increase in the number of blacks
entering previously or predominantly white univer-
sities, there arose cries that educational standards
would have to be lowered to accommodate them.
Some black students on these campuses faced the
stigma of being labeled "special admits" simply be-
cause of their racial identity. The presumption was
that they could not have been admitted under the
routine standards of the university. These examples
may not immediately suggest themselves as scien-
tific racism, but they perform the same function.
They assume a difference in mental capacity. They
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also assume that in the absence of overt prejudice,
blacks could not succeed on the basis of ability
alone. Where differences in the performance of
white students may be perceived as a routine distri-
bution of grades, racial connotations often accom-
pany a similar distribution among blacks.
Scientific racism in its traditional form has lost
currency in today's society. Gone are the anthropo-
metric measures that presumably located blacks at
the low end of an evolutionary scale. Gone also are
the crude assumptions regarding anatomic type and
social behavior. Our society has become more toler-
ant of differences, but that does not imply that eq-
uity prevails. There is still controversy regarding the
application and use of tests. Testing has the possibil-
ity of abuse— for example, the testing of servicemen
during World War I. These tests were used to verify
existing ideas concerning the inferiority of groups of
immigrants. Today testing is being used to reinforce
notions on the inheritability of intelligence or per-
formance capacity.
Increasing interest has been given to sociobiology
recently. While the findings in this field offer new
challenges to the understanding of human behavior,
it has the same potential for abuse as any idea that
roots human behavior in a genotypic context. In a
society still predisposed to discrimination, subtle
results in sociobiology can become an "objective"
rationale for public action. The history of scientific
racism has indicated that "objective" data may have
adverse subjective consequences. The study of
genetics in the field of etiology is not the same as
pursuing a qualitative difference in human beings.
The protection of the rights of human subjects in
scientific studies must never allow a repetition of the
Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment 19 where racial ideas
permitted 400 black men to go untreated for a com-
municable disease.
Scientific racism has caused the deaths of count-
less millions of people because of the presumption
that they were different, inferior, undeserving. In the
absence of an absolute scale of merit and in the pres-
ence of "final solutions" such as Adolph Hitler's, we
should be wary of labels, and particularly wary of
labels that claim to have a scientific foundation.
Any practice that contracts rather than expands the
human potential is pernicious, no practice more so
than prejudice as it is expressed in scientific racism.
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